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FOR EVORD 
Two pape r s  a r e  p re sen ted  h e r e  t o g e t h e r  i n  one package. The 
f i r s t  which f o l l o w s ,  is a  g e n e r a l  i n t r o d u c t o r y  and t h e o r e t i c a l  
d i=cuss ion  of t h e  problem of economic b e n e f i t s  e s t i m a t i o n  f o r  CIM 
t e c h n o l o g i e s .  I t  was w r i t t e n  by Robert U .  Ayres, l e a d e r  of t h e  
CIM p r o j e c t  and J e f f r e y  L. Funk, now a t  Westinghouse R&D c e n t e r .  
The second paper  p r e s e n t s  a p a r t i c u l a r  (macroeconometric> 
methodology as  a p p l i e d  t o  t h e  b e n e f i t s  of r o b o t s  and NC machine 
t o o l s  f o r  a  s i n g l e  count ry :  Japan.  I t  was w r i t t e n  by Shunsuke 
Mori, a  member of t h e  CIM p r o j e c t  team a t  IIASA. I t  is hoped 
t h a t  t h e  r e s u l t s  w i l l  be of c o n s i d e r a b l e  i n t e r e s t  i n  themse lves ,  
a s  wel l  a s  p rov id ing  a v i a b l e  model f o r  f u t u r e  e x t e n s i o n  t o  o t h e r  
c o u n t r i e s .  
Two e a r l i e r  CIM Working Papers  a r e  r e l e v a n t  t o  t h e  
approaches  d i s c u s s e d  h e r e ,  namely C Ayres 86f I and C Ayres 87bl . 
Thomas H .  Lee 
Program Leader 
Technology, Economy, S o c i e t y  
The Economic Benef it of Computer- Inte~rated Manuf acturinqr 
Introduct ion2, 
The evolution of manufacturing technology from the 
1820's until after World War I 1  can be characterized broadly 
as exploiting economies of mechanization, specialization, 
standardization, and scale. On an aggregate level, the 
productivity of workers was enormously increased by 
mechanization, subdividing, and rationalizing complex non- 
repetltlve tasks into a sequence of simpler repetitive ones, 
higher precision, and higher operating rates of machine 
tools, mass production of truly interchangeable standard 
parts, use of dedicated automatic machines to maximize parts 
output rates, and mechanical assistance for parts handling 
and assembly. Labor productivity improvements from the 
1828's to the 1958's vary from one product to another, but in 
many cases the overall improvement was several orders of 
magnitude. Metal cutting rates, for example, increased by 
over 18@ times from 1898 to 1978. However, by 1978 the 
potential for further improvements along the same lines was 
far more modest in most cases. Since 1958, the emphasis has 
shifted toward programmability and flexibility. The driving 
force for this shift arises out of the growing complexity and 
'Computer Integrated Manufacturing (CIM) refers to the use 
of computers to control the manufacture of discrete items. It 
covers, therefore, materials handling and storage, cutting, 
forming and shaping, parts, heat treating, surface finishing, 
j oining Ce. g. welding), assembly, and inspect ion. It also covers 
associated "overhead" activities such as design, product ion, 
engineering, quality control, plant operation, and internal 
maintenance, and packing and shipping. 
"This section has been taken from the prospectus for the CIM 
project C I IASA, September 30, 1986). 
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d i v e r s i t y  of t h e  modern i n d u s t r i a l  economy. 
I n c r e a s i n g l y ,  t h e  problem of p r o d u c t i o n  is a  problem of 
r e s o u r c e  p l a n n i n g  (1.e .  c o o r d i n a t i n g  s u p p l i e r s  and o p t i m i z i n g  
m a t e r i a l s  h a n d l i n g )  and of i n v e n t o r y  management. From 
a n o t h e r  p e r s p e c t i v e ,  t h e  problem of manufac tu r ing  is 
i n h e r e n t l y  i n f  ormat i o n - i n t e n s i v e ,  i n v o l v i n g  many t e n s  of 
t h o u s a n d s  of b i n a r y  go/no ( y e s / n o >  d e c i s i o n s  based  on s e n s o r y  
d a t a  g a t h e r e d  a t  many p o i n t s  i n  s p a c e  and t i m e  abou t  t h e  
s t a t e  of e a c h  t o o l ,  e a c h  component, e a c h  subsys tem,  and t h e  
p roduc t  i o n  env i ronment .  H i s t o r i c a l l y ,  o n l y  human workers  
have had t h e  s e n s o r y  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  a c q u i r e  and i n t e r p r e t  t h e  
d a t a  needed t o  make t h e s e  b i n a r y  go/no d e c i s i o n s .  However, 
s i n c e  t h e  e a r l y  1 9 8 0 ' s  manufac tu r ing  f i r m s  have begun t o  have 
a n  a v a i l a b l e  a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  humans: t h e  machine o r  r o b o t  
c o n t r o l l e d  by a  " smar t  s e n s o r " .  
The a c c u m u l a t i o n  of t e c h n o l o g i c a l  changes  i n  s o l i d - s t a t e  
e l e c t r o n i c s  and computer s c i e n c e  s i n c e  t h e  mid-28th c e n t u r y  
seems t o  have f i n a l l y  r e a c h e d  a  c r i t i c a i  p o i n t .  S o l i d - s t a t e  
m i c r o p r o c e s s o r s  l i n k e d  t o  s o l i d - s t a t e  s e n s o r y  d e v i c e s  w i l i  
soon b e g i n  t o  o f f e r  more a c c u r a t e  and r e l i a b l e  means of 
c o o r d i n a t i n g  t h e  complex p r o c e s s e s  r e q u i r e d  i n  modern 
manufac tu r ing .  "Smart s e n s o r s "  a r e  c r i t i c a l  b u i l d i n g  b l o c k s  
of t h e  f o r e s e e a b l e  computer- i n t e g r a t e d ,  unmanned 
manufac tu r ing  p l a n t  of t h e  f u t u r e . "  
I t  is one p r imary  h y p o t h e s i s  of t h e  CIM s t u d y  t h a t  t h e  
d r i v i n g  f o r c e  beh ind  t h i s  change is not  a  wish  t o  a v o i d  h i g h  
. ., 
.:-.For a  more e x t e n d e d  d i s c u s s i o n  of t h e s e  i s s u e s  i n  t h e  CIM 
Working Paper  s e r i e s  s e e  [ A y r e s  8 6 f ,  Ayres 8 7 b l .  
"See Ayres I: Ayres & Funk 8 5 ,  Ayres 8 6 ~ 1 ,  a r t i c l e s  
fo r thcoming  i n  R o b o t i c s  J o u r n a l  and Prometeus .  
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labor costs per se, but the need to escape from the 
bureaucratic inflexibility of organizations and the physical 
inflexiblity of mechanisms that were the price of relying on 
error-prone human workers for all of the micro-scale 
information processing functions in the conventional factory. 
Ultimately, it may be the desire to continually increase 
reliability and quality without sacrificin~ flexiblity that 
is the chief driving force behind the trend toward computer 
integrated manufacturing. 
In addition, we hope to test several subsidiary* 
hypotheses: 
- that flexiblity to respond quickly to market changes is 
at best a secondary motivation for most early users in 
the first tier (systems integrators) and third tier 
suppliers (job shops), but may become a strong 
motivation for second-tier suppliers currently dependent 
on "Detroit Automation". 
- that, currently, CIM is not needed by large-scale 
producers (systems integrators) to achieve maj or 
inventory savings and faster turnaround, and that CIM 
will get increased attention by these manufacturers only 
after the "easy" savings from statistical quality 
control, ' just-in-time' methods (kan-ban) , or materials- 
resource planning (MRP) have already been achieved. CIM 
may offer more immediate benefits to second tier 
suppliers who are under increasing pressure from their 
customers to meet more exacting delivery schedules, with 
shorter production runs. 
- that economies of scale will have a decreasing influence 
in coming decades, whereas economies of scope (1. e. 
capital sharing facilitated by increased flexibility) 
will have an increasing influence. 
- that, as a consequence of increasing flexiblity of major 
second-tier suppliers, the traditional niche for 
specialty subcontractors and suppliers will erode. 
Benefits Measurement 
The various hypotheses stated above imply that improved 
product quality and increased flexibility in the use of 
capital are beneficial to users of CIM. However the argument 
thus far is only qualitative. To carry it a step further one 
must define quality and flexibility more precisely and 
formulate them in terms of conventional economic variables 
and models. This is the next task to be undertaken, and it 
is a vital one. 
To organize the discussion, it is helpful to consider 
five possible kinds of economic benefit. The list follows: 
1. Labor savinx. Some CIM technologies (most notably 
robots) can be regarded as direct substitutes for semi- 
skilled human labor. This means that robots (sometimes 
called "steel collar workers") can also be regarded as 
additions to the labor force, although their 'wages' are 
partly operating costs and partly costs of capital. 
2. Capacity augmentinq. Some CIM technologies, such as 
scheduling systems and programmable controllers (PC's) 
with sensory feedback, can be regarded as creating 
additions to capacity. This is the case to the extent 
that they increase the effective utilization of existing 
machine tools and other capital equipment (e. g. by 
permitting unmanned operat ion at night > or permit faster 
turnarounds and reductions in the inventory of work-in- 
progress. The productivity of capital is thus 
increased. 
3. Capital-sharing. The major benefit of "flexibility", as 
the concept is normally understood, is that it permits 
faster response to changing market conditions, or 
superior ability to differentiate products.& The major 
reason for slow response is the widespread use of 
dedicated, specialized ("Detroit" > automat ion in mass 
product ion. Here, the lowest possible marginal unit 
cost is achieved at the expense of very high fixed 
capital investment and large write-offs in case the 
product becomes obsolete and cannot be sold. 
Flexibility in this context is the ability to adapt (or 
switch) capital equipment from one generation of a 
product to the next. The term flexibility is also 
widely used in a rather different context, to describe a 
futuristic concept analogous to an automated job shop, 
capable of producing "parts on demand". In either case, 
capital is shared among several products rather than 
dedicated to a single one. Evidently capital-sharing is 
practically indistinguishable from capacity 
augmentation. However it is perhaps slightly preferable 
"A more extended discussion of the rfelationship between 
flexibility and product differentiability (i.e. via design 
change flexibility or "mix flexibility") can be found in 
Boyer and Cor iat (1987 > . 
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to model it as an extension of the lifetime of existing 
capital or (in some cases) as credit for capital 
recovery. 
4. Product quality improvement. The term 'quality' is not 
very precise, since it comprises at least two aspects; 
(1) product reliability (defect reduction), and (2)  
product performance. The latter can be disregarded, 
here, as being an aspect of product change (discussed 
next). It is postulated that several CIM technologies, 
especially the use of "smart sensors" in conjunction 
with programmable controllers, will eventually reduce 
the in-process error/defect rate. Moreover, these 
technologies will also permit more complete and more 
accurate testing and inspection of workpieces and final 
products. A quantitative measure of product 
reliablility is needed, if possible, better than the 
simple 'percentage of time operating' measure that 
appears throughout the human factors literature C e. g .  
McCormick & Sanders 821. 
5. Acceleration of product performance improvement. As 
noted above in connection with quality, improved product 
performance can be distinguished in principle from 
improved product reliability through reduced 
error/defect rates. The latter is a function of the 
manufacturing process only, whereas the former requires 
changes in the actual design of the product. It was 
pointed out that one benefit of flexiblity is that it 
reduces the cost of each product change. A further 
benefit is that, as a result, product redesigns are 
likely to be more frequent. The problem, for an 
economist, is to find empircal evidence of a 
relationship between the cost of product redesign and 
retooling and the rate of product performance 
improvement. This appears to be a relatively unplowed 
field of research, to date. 
Static vs. Dynamic Approaches to Benefits Measurement 
Up to this point, we have not attempted to consider the 
question: benefits to whom? In fact, this is a critical 
issue because short-run benefits are likely to be 
appropriated mainly by producers (as profits), whereas in the 
long run in a competitive economy essentially all of the 
benefits will be passed on to consumers through product price 
reduct ions, performance improvements, and wage increases. ". 
More important for our purposes, it is only the short- 
term benefits appropriable as profit by producers that can 
directly motivate innovation and technological diffusion 
[Mansfield 61, 681. In this context, it is clear that in a 
static environment, labor saving, capacity augmentation and 
capital sharing may contribute immediately to profitability. 
On the other hand, product quality and performance 
improvements may have a less direct impact on profitability 
in the short run, except to the extent that error/defect 
control has a direct effect on costs, 
In a static world of competitive 'price-takers', and 
given 'fixed' and 'variable' costs, the optimum (short-run 
&,This effect is reflected In the long-term rise in "labor 
share" of output. 
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p r o f i t  maximizing) p r o d u c t i o n  l e v e l  is d e t e r m i n e d  by t h e  
shape  of t h e  v a r i a b l e  c o s t  c u r v e .  Assuming t h e  u s u a l  U- 
shaped v a r i a b l e  c o s t  c u r v e ,  t h e  optimum p r o d u c t i o n  l e v e l  is 
found by e q u a t i n g  marg ina l  revenue and marg ina l  c o s t .  I f  
demand i n c r e a s e s ,  b u t  t o t a l  c a p a c i t y  r e m a i n s  f i x e d ,  p r i c e s  
and  p r o f i t s  w i l l  r i se ,  and v i c e  v e r s a .  I f  t h e  i n d u s t r y  is 
p r o f i t a b l e ,  any  e x i s t i n g  ( o r  new) p roducer  c a n  i n c r e a s e  h i s  
c a p a c i t y ,  t h u s  r e d u c i n g  h i s  a v e r a g e  c o s t s  and breakeven p o i n t  
and he can  i n c r e a s e  market s h a r e  by p r i c e  c u t t i n g .  But i f  
s e v e r a l  p r o d u c e r s  do t h i s ,  t h e  r e s u l t  is o v e r c a p a c i t y  and 
l o s s e s .  Moreover,  assuming n o n - c o n v e r t i b l e  ( i n f l e x i b l e )  
c a p i t a l ,  t h e  e f f e c t i v e  marg ina l  c o s t  now becomes t h e  marg ina l  
v a r i a b l e  c o s t  and e a c h  c o m p e t i t o r  w i l l  go on p roduc ing  even 
i f  it e a r n s  no n e t  r e t u r n  on c a p i t a l .  I n  f a c t ,  t h e  s t a t i c  
c o m p e t i t i v e  market  is i n h e r e n t l y  u n s t a b l e  (and t h e r e f o r e  n o t  
s t a t i c )  a t  any  f i n i t e  p r o f i t  l e v e l .  
In o t h e r  words ( a s  Schumpeter p o i n t e d  o u t  long a g o ) ,  
p r o f i t s  i n  a  c o m p e t i t i v e  market  are i n h e r e n t l y  a  dynamic 
phenomenon r e f l e c t i n g  a n  e x p l o i t a b l e  temporary  c o s t  o r  p r i c e  
advan tage .  The advan tage  a t  any  moment i n  t i m e  may be due  t o  
s u p e r i o r  brand-name r e c o g n i t i o n ,  c h e a p e r  l a b o r  o r  ene rgy  
s o u r c e s ,  b e t t e r  l o c a t i o n  v i s  a  v i s  m a r k e t s ,  more e f f i c i e n t  
p r o d u c t i o n  t e c h n o l o g y  o r  b e t t e r  p roduc t  d e s i g n .  But u n l e s s  
one o r  more of t h e s e  a d v a n t a g e s  is p r o t e c t e d ,  e .  g .  by brand- 
name c o p y r i g h t  ( e .  g .  'Coke' ) ,  a  monopoly f r a n c h i s e  (CBS) , an 
i m p e n e t r a b l e  s e c r e t  o r  a  se t  of i n t e r l o c k i n g  p a t e n t s ,  
p r o f i t a b i l i t y  w i l l  l a s t  j u s t  a s  long  as  it t a k e s  f o r  a  
c o m p e t i t o r  t o  i m i t a t e  o r  improve on t h e  p r o d u c t  and/or  b u i l d  
a l a r g e r  o r  newer p l a n t .  
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I t  f o l l o w s ,  t h e r e f  o r e ,  t h a t  c o r ~ t i n u o u s  long-term 
p r o f i t a b l i t y  f o r  a  f i r m  c a n  o n l y  be a s s u r e d  by a  c o n t i n u o u s  
p r o c e s s  of c r e a t i n g  and e x p l o i t i n g  new a d v a n t a g e s  (of some 
k i n d )  t o  r e p l a c e  t h e  o l d e r ,  d i s s i p a t i n g  ones .  Opening new 
marke t s ,  a d v e r t i s i n g ,  p r o d u c t  improvment, p r o c e s s  improvement 
-- a l l  a r e  means of c r e a t i n g  c o m p e t i t i v e  a d v a n t a g e s .  Forward 
mot i o n  is e s s e n t i a l  : t o  be s t a t i o n a r y  is t o  s i n k  and be 
overwhelmed. A moving b i c y c l e ,  a  l a s s o ,  a  'hula-hoop'  , a  
c h i l d ' s  t o p  o r  a  wa te r  s k i  a r e  dynamica l ly  s t a b l e ;  b u t  when 
t h e  motion s t o p s  t h e  s y s t e m  c o l l a p s e s .  The same t h i n g  h o l d s  
t r u e  f o r  s p e c i e s  i n  a n  ecosys tem o r  f i r m  i n  a  c o m p e t i t i v e  
market .  There  is no s a f e  p l a c e  t o  h i d e  i n d e f i n i t e l y  from 
hungry p r e d a t o r s  s e e k i n g  a  meal o r  hungry c o m p e t i t o r s  s e e k i n g  
a market .  
In  s h o r t ,  o n l y  a  dynamic model f i r m  b e h a v i o r  h a s  any 
v a l u e  i n  a s s e s s i n g  t h e  b e n e f i t s  of CIM t e c h n o l o g i e s  ( o r ,  
i n d e e d ,  any o t h e r  t e c h n o l o g i e s  p rov ided  e x o g e n o u s l y ) .  
Fur the rmore ,  it is e s s e n t i a l  t o  view t h e  f i r m  i n  its 
c o m p e t i t i v e  env i ronment .  Most s i m p l e  models of t h e  b e h a v i o r  
of t h e  f i r m  assume a s t a t i c  envi ronment  ( e .  g .  a r ~  exogenous 
demand s c h e d u l e  o r  market  p r i c e  and n e g l e c t  t h e  r e a l i t i e s  of 
c o m p e t i t i v e  r e s p o n s e .  I f  a l l  competing f i r m s  adop ted  a  more 
e f f i c i e n t  p r o d u c t i o n  t e c h n o l o g y  s i m u l t a n e o u s l y ,  none would 
g a i n  any s p e c i a l  advan tage  o v e r  t h e  o t h e r s  b u t  a l l  would b e a r  
t h e  c o s t  of t h e  n e c e s s a r y  inves tment .  To t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  t h e  
a d o p t i o n  of more e f f i c i e n t  p r o d u c t i o n  p r o c e s s e s  (CIM) r e s u l t s  
i n  lower c o s t s  and t h e s e  a r e  s u b s e q u e n t l y  p a s s e d  on t o  
consumers a s  lower p r i c e s ,  t h e  market f o r  each  p roduc t  might 
(or might not) grow enough to result in increased 
profitability for the producer, ceteris paribus. 
A Simple Dynamic Model for Estimating Private Benefits 
(Profitability) of an Innovative Production Technique 
Suppose, for a moment, that each CIM adopter is a 
monopolist in its market 'niche' and that this market is 
characterized by a constant price elasticityE' 
where P is the product price and Q is the physical output <= 
demand) level. The producers prof it (per unit time) can be 
defined 
where C is a cost function. One commonly assumed simple cost 
function is the so-called 'experience curve' '<> 
'At first glance this is a very heroic assumption, but 
it is consistent with the notion that firms with similar 
product ion technologies can compete by product 
differentiation. This formulation was introduced by 
Chamberlin (1933, 1953). 
'""T h i assumption is also moderately heroic, though 
widely used in macroeconomic models. See, e. g. Houthakker & 
Taylor 1970. 
'The experience curve is often parametrized in terms of the 
ratio s of end-of-period costs to beginning-of-period costs, 
after each doubling of cumulative output. Typical values of s 
range iron 8.9 to U . 6 .  The lower the value of s, the faster 
costs are deciining. For a recent survey of the microeconomic 
literature relating experience curves and cost functions, see 
C Gul ledge and Womer 861 . 
where N(t> is cumulative output up to time t 
and b is a parameter characteristic of the industry (see 
Figure 1). I f  the market demand Q is growing exponentially 
at a rate K 
then it follows from (1) that 
and from ( 5 )  and ( 6 )  that 
whence 
where 
i Semi-conductor active elements (1 964-1 977) $/unit 
MOS dynamic RAM production (1973-78) 
$/kilobit 
Integrated circuits (1 964-72) $/unit* 
Free-standing gas ranges (1 947-67) $/unit 
Digital watches (1975-78) $/unit 
Hand-held calculators (1975-78) $/unit 
0 .401 Disc memory drives (1 975-78) $/kilobit 
I qj- PVC price (1 946-1 968) $/lb. 
Steel production (1920-1 955) man-hrslton 
0.30- 
-~ i rc ra f t  assembly (1 925-57) man-hrslunit 
Petroleum cracking (1942-58) $/bbl* 
Crushed limestone (1929-71 ) $/ton* 
MOS-LS1 production (1 970-76) $/unit 
0.20- 
Petroleum refining (1 860-1962) man-hrslbbl 
Model "T" Ford (1910-1 926) $/unit 
0.10- Catalytic cracking (1946-1958) man-hrslbbl 
Electric power generation (1910-1955) $/kwh" 
0 I I 1 I I I 1 
Slope of the Experience Curve 
Source: Ayres, 1985 c. 
Figure 1. Experience curve parameters for various industries. 
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For Kt > >  1 (9) reduces to 
In this case it can be shown easily CAyres 85cI that the 
condition for prow in^ profitability is 
Condition (12) therefore requires v > 2 if b = 8.5 and a 
> 10 if b = 0.1. The condition is relatively easily met for 
fast gowing industries with large values of b (such as 
semiconductors> but it cannot be sat isf led by more mature 
industries with small values of b. 
One obvious implication of the above result is that true 
monopolists, who are fairly rare, -- in contrast to 
Chamberlinian monopolists -- are likely to have less 
incentive to adopt new production technologies than actively 
competing firms. In practice, oligopolists in mature, slow- 
growing industries (small b) do apparently have rather little 
incentive to innovate. Among a number of competing firms, 
however, the earlier adopter of a more efficient production 
technology is the one who will gain a temporary advantage and 
increase his prof itability, market share or both. (Here 
long-term growth in profitability is not at issue). On the 
other hand, if the innovation is unsuccessful, the early 
adopter is worse off than the non-adopter. The choice, -- to 
adopt, or not -- is then made on the basis of failure risk 
, - '  
vi= a vie perceived benefits in case of success [ Ayres & Mori 
861. It is important to realize, however, that the "game" in 
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slow-growth industries is likely to be even less favorable 
than "zero sum". In fact, if the innovation is a success 
early adopters probably gain less than late adopters will 
lose. The problem is that nobody can opt out of the game 
(prisoners dilemma), so that change of any kind is risky. 
The simple model above explicitly assumes that the 
benefits to CIM adopters are reflected in lower costs, rather 
than irLcreased demand due (for instance) to superior product 
differentiability resulting in faster adaptation to market 
changes. 
However, the apparent limitation can be partially 
overcome by adopting a Lancastrlarl point of view, namely that 
product services are, in fact, differentiated bundles of 
characteristics. A shift in demand function due to product 
" improvement" is practically indistinguishable from a shift 
in supply function due to process improvement. Either the 
firm can provide more "utiles" per unit cost, or a given 
number of "utiles" at less cost. The experience curve is 
likely to be as applicable to the one case as to the other. 
The analytical problem we must now face is as follows: 
given a competitive market and a risky innovation of 
uncertain success, how should a rational management play the 
rame? And, given evidence of success by some early adopters, Y 
how can "followers" be expected to react? These are s o m e  ke-j 
issues for future research. 
'"'There is a considerable debate in the literature on 
the microeconomic foundations of -'experience curves' (e. g. 
Arrow, 1963, Alchian, 1963) but the empirical evidence is 
fairly convincing. 
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Profitability and Diffusionfl 
The rate at which new technologies substitute for 
established ones has often been found to follow an S curve 
[ Fisher & Pry, 19711 . However, the underlying mechanisms for 
this have never been fully explained. The most widely 
accepted reason is that new technologies follow a first order 
diffusion process (demand proportional to fractional market 
penetration) and a second order saturation process. The 
solution to the differential equation (df/dt = a£ - bf2:> 
representing this situation, where f is the fractional market 
penetration and a and b are constants, is the simplest form 
of curve, known as a logistic function. While this model is 
analytically simple and fits a wide variety of ex post data 
[ibidl, it offers no clues for ex ante prediction of the rate 
at which diffusion will occur. Much of the technological 
forecasting literature has used this model assuming a prior1 
that an S curve will represent the rate of introduction. The 
usual procedure is to determine the parameters of the curve 
by curve-fitting. An ex ante methodology is greatly to be 
desired. Mansfield [Mansfield 61, 681 was the first to 
attempt this task using econometric methods. More recent 
efforts along these lines have been reported by Blackman 
[Blackman 741, Martino [ Martino et al. 781 and others. 
The rate at which initial diffusion occurs has been 
found to depend empirically on the expected profitability of 
the new technology, the absolute size of the investment, the 
tendency for the industry to innovate, and the time- 
"This section is based on a previously unpublished working 
paper by Jeffrey L .  Funk and the author (dated January, 1983). 
- 16 - 
preference (or discount) factor. Profitablity can be 
represented by a firm producing the product or using the new 
technology at a rate that will maximize its present value 
over a planning horizon. The size of the investment and the 
industry will determine a firms's attitude towards risk and 
short-term losses. The industry's tendency to innovate 
should also affect the time horizon considered. These ideas 
are the basis for the model described hereafter. 
The rate at which a new technology is introduced in a 
sector can be viewed as a summation of the rates at which 
individual firms introduce the new technology. Each firm 
will introduce the new technology in a way that will maximize 
its objective function. We will assume the firm' s objective 
is to maximize the present value of future prof its over some 
time horizon, subject to a constraint on cumulative losses 
allowed. The control variable for the problem is the price 
P!t> or the quantity Q(t>, as a function of time. If the 
price is set below cost the firm sells temporarily at a loss 
but gains production experience permitting it to reduce its 




- 17 - 
and 
P(t) = unit price at time t 
C(t> = unit cost at time t 
Q(t> = quantity produced per unit time 
6 = discount rate 
Before considering more complex cases, it is interesting 
to note that for the simple case of Chamberlinian monopolist 
in a 'niche', confronting a fixed price elasticity w ,  and a 
given market price, the optimal rate of CIM adoption k has 
been shown (Ayres, 1985) to be as follows: 
where 6 is the adopting firms effective discount rate, and r 
is its target rate of return on investments. Alternatively 
(r-6) represents the 'risk-premium' set by the firm, over and 
above the discount rate. 
A more complex model results if one introduces a loss 
constraint. A constraint on the maximum loss per period can 
be expressed as: 
A total loss constraint could also be introduced. Firms 
may have different cost functions, discount rates, cumulative 
loss constraints, and demand curves. The cost function wiil 
vary for each firm depending on its existing capital stock 
and personnel but in general it will decline as a function of 
~zumulative product ion experience [ e. g. Cunningham 881 . The 
c o s t  of e q u i t y  and d e b t  c a p i t a l  a s  w e l l  a s  management r i s k  
p r e f e r e n c e s  and p e r c e p t i o n s  of f u t u r e  p r o s p e c t s  c a n  r e s u l t  i n  
wide ly  v a r y i n g  d i s c o u n t  ra tes  CAyres & Mori 861. The 
c u m u l a t i v e  l o s s  c o n s t r a i n t  w i l l  depend on a f i r m ' s  l i q u i d i t y  
and its management 's  a t t i t u d e  towards  r i s k .  The t i m e  h o r i z o n  
c o n s i d e r e d  is a l s o  a v a i l a b l e .  I t  p r o b a b l y  depends  on t h e  
r a t e  of exogenous t e c h n o l o g i c a l  change,  i . e .  on t h e  e x p e c t e d  
t i m e  b e f o r e  t h e  e x i s t i n g  t e c h n o l o g y  becomes o b s o l e t e .  Other  
d i f f e r e n c e s  between f i r m s  and t h e i r  p r o d u c t s  w i l l  a f f e c t  t h e  
demand f o r  a produc t  a s  a f u n c t i o n  of p r i c e  and o t h e r  
a t t r i b u t e s .  These d i f f e r e n c e s  w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  e a c h  f i r m  
i n t r o d u c i n g  t h e  new t e c h n o l o g y  a t  a d i f f e r e n t  t i m e  and r a t e .  
New t e c h n o l o g i e s  c a n  be d i v i d e d  i n t o  new p r o c e s s e s  which 
produce  o l d  p r o d u c t s  and new p r o d u c t s  which a r e  produced w i t h  
e x i s t i n g  o r  new p r o c e s s e s .  CIM is b a s i c a l l y  a se t  of p r o c e s s  
i n n o v a t i o n s .  Old p r o d u c t s  produced by a  new p r o c e s s  w i l l  
normal ly  be marketed  i n i t i a l l y  a t  t h e  same p r i c e  a s  t h e  o l d  
1 p r o c e s s  t o  p r e v e n t  p r o d u c t s  f rom t h e  same f i r m  f rom competing 
w i t h  e a c h  o t h e r .  Here t h e  d e c i s i o n  v a r i a b l e  f o r  t h e  a d o p t e r  
0 - *  
is t h e  q u a n t i t y  of p r o d u c t s  t o  be produced by C I M  v i s  a  v i s  
t h e  q u a n t i t y  produced by t h e  o l d  p r o c e s s .  Thus,  f o r  t h e  
moment, w e  c o n s i d e r  o n l y  t h e  c a s e  of a produc t  demand curve  
t h a t  is n o t  c h a n g i n g  o v e r  t i m e .  
Cons ide r  a  (new) f i r m  t h a t  wishes  t o  adop t  a  new p r o c e s s  
(:CIM> t o  produce  a n  e s t a b l i s h e d  p r o d u c t .  The market p r i c e  
A 
f o r  t h e  p r o d u c t  is P. The CIM-adopter h a s  u n i t  c o s t s  C that  
w i l l  d e c r e a s e  a s  a f u n c t i o n  of c u m u l a t i v e  o u t p u t  by t h e  new 
p r o c e s s .  I t  is f r e e  t o  o f f e r  its produc t  a t  a d i f f e r e n t  
p r i c e  P t h a t  r n i ~ h t  be e i t h e r  h i g h e r  o r  lower t h a n  6.  I t  
confronts a constant demand function which is a function of 
A 
both P and f, For the CIM adopter, the problem is expressed 
by (13) above, where its cost function C is given by equation 
(3) and N is given by equation ( 4 ) .  
Let 6 be the quantity by the old process produced and 
let f be the market penetration of the new process. It is 
reasonable to assume that the market share of Q is a function 
A 
of the relative prices P and P, but that -- for various 
reasons (including inertia and 'intangibles') -- the market 
A 
will tolerate some price differential (P  Y P), even though 
the products produced by CIM technology are assumed to be 
identical to those produced by conventional technology. 
However the market responds to any differential by increasing 
demand for the lower priced source. 
A mathematical relationship that satisfies this 
condition (while being less restrictive than the constant 
price elasticity assumption) is the following: 
h 
where Q is the quantity produced by conventional means 
The parameters A ,  T and rr (see equation 1) are all to be 
determined; P is a variable, while 6 is now assumed to be 
constant. 
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Thus t h e  CIM a d o p t e r  now sees t h e  problem a s :  
where 
and (15) must be s a t i s f i e d  i n  a l l  p e r i o d s .  
Taking t h e  d e r i v a t i v e s  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  t i m e  t :  
The mathemat ica l  c o m p l e x i t y  of t h i s  f o r m u l a t i o n  c o n c e a l s  
a n  e s s e n t i a l  t r a d e o f f  t h a t  t h e  CIM a d o p t e r  must f a c e :  I t s  
c o s t s  w i l l  d e c r e a s e  w i t h  a c c u m u l a t i n g  e x p e r i e n c e ;  and its 
c o s t s  w i l l  t h e r e f o r e  f a l l  f a s t e r  i f  it s e t s  its i n i t i a l  
( e n t r y )  p r i c e  P a s  low a s  p o s s i b l e ,  t o  g a i n  t h e  l a r g e s t  
p o s s i b l e  i n i t i a l  market s h a r e .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  its 
i n i t i a l  u n i t  c a s t s  c a n  be e x p e c t e d  t o  be h i g h ,  due  t o  break-  
i n  problems and  it w i l l  e x p e c t  t o  l o s e  money f o r  a  whi le  
T h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  f a s t e r  t h e  i n t e n d e d  p e n e t r a t i o n ,  t h e  l a r g e r  
t h e  i n i t i a l  l o s s .  I t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  ( i n  t h i s  model> t h e  
p e n e t r a t i o n  r a t e  is l i m i t e d  by t h e  maximum a n n u a l  s t a r t u p  
l o s s  t h a t  can  be s u s t a i n e d .  
T h i s  problem c a n  be s o l v e d  u s i n g  Optimal  C o n t r o l  Theory 
a s  d e s c r i b e d  i n  t h e  Appendix. When t h e r e  isn't a n y  
c o n s t r a i n t  on t h e  c u m u l a t i v e  l o s s e s  t h e  d i f f u s i o n  p r o c e s s  
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need not occur at a finite rate. Each curve is for a 
different initial cost. Numerical solutions are shown in 
Figure 2. The higher the initial cost the lower the final. 
saturation level but the basic shape of the curve is not 
changed. Cumulative revenues are shown in Figure 3 for the 
same initial costs. Total profits (above an acceptable 
return on equity) over twenty-five years decrease with higher 
initial costs. If the initial cost was greater than C, = 23,  
no production should occur because it would result in 
negative profits. For lower initial costs the cumulative 
revenues early in the life of the project are negative, which 
requires liquid capital. The firm can go bankrupt if the 
pool of liquid capital dries up before profitability is 
achieved. 
Because there is no penalty for decreasing output (thus 
resulting in unused capacity), a cumulative loss constraint 
causes the firm to have a discontinuous price path which 
results in a discontinuous output path. In real life a firm 
would not change its price instantaneously to eliminate 
excess capacity or to achieve better customer relations in 
the short run. This was resolved by assuming a constant 
initial price (close to prices satisfying the necessary 
conditions) until the costs were reduced to the initial price 
without violating the cumulative loss constraint. The 
solution then follows from the necessary conditions. This 
produced continuous solutions for price and output. Market 
penetration is shown in Figure 4 for price elasticities of . 5  
and 1. There is some resemblance to a traditional S curve, 
but the differences are significant. 

I 
I I I 
5 10 15 20 25 Time 
F i g u r e  3.  Cumulat ive  revenues  v s .  t i m e  For d i f f e r e n t  i n i t i a l  
c o s t s .  
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Conclusion 
In this paper, a simple dynamic model based on the 
'experience curve' for estimating private benefits (to the 
firm) is briefly discussed and some possible directions for 
extension are indicated. An application of the model to 
predicting penetration (or diffusion) rates is discussed 
also. 
It was pointed out that there is another dimension of 
the problem, viz. to estimate social benefits. To be sure, 
the likelihood of social benefits does not, in itself, 
provide a motivation for private firms to adopt a new 
technology. In a centrally planned socialist economy, of 
course, such a distinction should (in principle) be 
unnecessary. But quite apart from the motivational aspect, 
there is a very important methodological problem to be faced. 
As noted previously, we need a dynamic model for evaluating 
social benefits of CIM (or other new technologies). Such a 
model is suggested by Mori in the following paper and 
preliminary results are obtained for the Japanese economy. 
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AFPEND I X 
Introducing the Hamiltonian function: 
where Q and p are adjoint variables for N and a respectiveiy, and 
P, P, N, a, n and p are all functions of time. The optimal time 
paths for N and P are determined by the necessary conditions of 
Pantryagin' s maximum principle: 
( 2 )  aH/'aP = 0 
( 3 )  aH/aN = -drl/dt 
(4) aH/an = - d ~ / d t  
( 5 )  a ~ / a n  = d ~ ~ / d t  
(6) a~/a,, = dn/dt 
( 7 )  7 r >  -D 
( 8 )  rl (T) = 0 
(9) p(T) = 0 
From (I), ( 2 )  = 8 and using (9): 
(10) p(it) = 8. 
Applying the necessary conditions 
Solving for P leaves two differential equations <13 and 14) 
with two unknowns (N and n). When the cumulative loss constraint 
is not violated a numerical solution can be found by assuming 
r l < @ )  and solving difference equations iteratively until ,,(TI = 8 
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